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Summary – An analytical framework is proposed for analysis of environmental good production by farmers in the
case of price uncertainty. Environmental good production contracted by means of agri-environmental agreements is
treated as a riskless option in the farmer’s production activities portfolio. It is shown that agri-environmental
agreements aiming at biodiversity competing with beef production are likely to increase management intensity on the
non-enrolled land, and that the effect of the payments for these agreements on the number of hectares enrolled is
ambiguous. It is also demonstrated that an increase in the output price variability and/or a decrease in the level of
decoupled subsidies will induce an increase (decrease) in the area enrolled in agreements aiming at biodiversity
competing with (complementary to) beef production. The obtained results are illustrated by means of efficient frontiers
generated using mathematical programming farm level models of suckler cow farms inMonts du Cantal , in France.
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Production de biens environnementaux dans une gestion optimale d’un portefeuille d’activités
d’un agriculteur avec aversion au risque
Résumé – Cet article propose un cadre d’analyse de la production de biens environnementaux par des
agriculteurs en situation d’incertitude sur les prix. La production de biens environnementaux contractée
par des mesures agri-environnementales est considérée comme une activité sans risque dans le portefeuille
d’activités d’un agriculteur. Nous montrons que l’adoption d’une mesure agri-environnementale favorable
à la biodiversité au détriment de la production bovine favorise l’intensification de cette dernière
production, tandis que l’effet du niveau des paiements pour ce type de contrat sur le nombre d’hectares
souscrits est ambigu. Nous montrons aussi qu’une augmentation de la variabilité de prix des outputs, et/
ou une baisse du niveau d’une aide découplée, aura un effet positif (négatif) sur le nombre d’hectares dédié
à la production de biodiversité en concurrence (complémentaire) avec la production bovine. Ces résultats
sont illustrés à l’aide de frontières d’efficacité en mobilisant un modèle de programmation mathématique
appliqué aux élevages allaitants des Monts du Cantal, en France.
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1. Introduction
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform of June 2003 follows the trend of
decoupling agricultural subsidies from production activities with the aim to fulfil the
World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments requiring application of less trade
distorting agricultural policy instruments. Progressive reduction of the price support
and of coupled subsidies, which accompanies this reform, is likely to increase the price
volatility of agricultural outputs. As Hennessy (1998) demonstrated, under uncertainty
even decoupled subsidies influence behaviour of a risk-averse farmer. Thus it seems
meaningful to apply models which enable to account for uncertainty and for farmers’
risk aversion if evaluating agricultural policies. In this paper, we propose such a
framework for analysis of environmental good production by farmers when contracted
by means of agri-environmental agreements.
Uncertainty is an important issue concerning the joint production of agricultural
and environmental goods. Vermersch (2001) considers uncertainty as a special source of
jointness. Hanley and Oglethorpe (1999) support indirectly this concept when they
state that the guaranteed nature of agri-environmental payments offered to UK farmers
represented for them an important incentive to adopt these agreements ‘as a risk-
reducing management tool’. In our paper, we do not consider uncertainty as an
independent source of jointness. We investigate rather how the volatility of output
prices changes the willingness of farmers to comply with agri-environmental
agreements if one or another of the main sources of jointness as defined by the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2001) is present:
allocable fixed inputs (competing production) and non-allocable inputs
(complementary production).
Joint production of agricultural commodities, beef, and an environmental good,
grassland biodiversity, is investigated here. The quantity of biodiversity produced
depends on the grassland management intensity. Usually some special level of farming
activity is required and the quantity of biodiversity produced falls both if this level is
not attained and if it is exceeded. For example Balent et al . (1998) found that in the
Pyrenees the species richness of pastures slightly increases when the dry mass
consumption increases from 0.5 tonnes per hectare per year to something more than
1 tonne per hectare per year, but above this value it starts to fall. The optimal level of
beef production is not unique for all biotopes. Thus some fragile biotopes require only
very low levels of farming intensity and the beef and biodiversity production is
generally competing there. The competition is caused by the presence of an allocable
fixed input: the grassland. It can be considered as allocable because it should be
partially or completely diverted from beef production in order to secure biodiversity
production. On the other hand, there are regions where biodiversity is permanently
jeopardised by invasive species and it would be lost without sufficiently high
management intensity. There the beef and biodiversity production are generally
complementary. The source of complementarity is the presence of a non-allocable
input: the cattle herd. An increase in the number of livestock units enables to produce
at the same time more beef and more biodiversity. We chose to deal with grassland11
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biodiversity production by suckler cow farms precisely for this opportunity to analyse
both complementary and competing agricultural and environmental good production.
This paper complements the work presented by Havlík et al . (2005) by
transposing the analysis of environmental good production under uncertainty from the
expected utility framework to the mean-variance framework. Generally, if a risk-averse
farmer has the possibility to produce several outputs, he will not only adjust the overall
supply but also its structure in the search for the optimum portfolio of activities. We
consider the application of the separation theorem described by Tobin (1958) in the
financial theory context, in order to simplify the portfolio optimisation problem and to
make its solution more tractable. Tobin demonstrated that if both risky and riskless
assets are available, the optimisation proceeds in two steps. First, the optimum
portfolio of risky assets is assembled, whose composition does not depend on the risk
aversion of the investor. Second, the investor decides depending on his risk aversion
which share of money he invests in the risky portfolio and which share should be held
in the riskless asset. Thus as long as the riskless asset is present in the optimum
portfolio, the relative composition of risky assets remains constant, and we can deal
with the multitude of risky assets as with a single composite one.
The Tobin’s separation theorem was applied to analyse the farm diversification
problem already by Johnson (1967) who considered as a riskless option the land leasing
in or out. He concluded that a strongly risk-averse farmer will tend to lease out a share
of his land in order to ensure a higher stability of returns, while a risk-neutral farmer
will rather tend to lease in some additional land in order to increase his expected
returns even if this will increase their variability. Roche and McQuinn (2004) applied
the same separation theorem to the analysis of the European Union’s CAP reform of
the June 2003. They found that a complete decoupling of agricultural subsidies will
encourage farmers who choose to produce, to introduce in their portfolio of activities
riskier outputs than before the reform.
Our model is based on the assumption that the agricultural commodities
represent risky activities due to stochastic output prices – the unique source of
uncertainty in the model. The agricultural commodities are throughout the paper
designed by a general term – beef. But this general term covers different combinations
of animal categories produced on the farm (animals sold at various ages, fattened or
lean, etc.). To each animal category correspond a specific expected price and specific
price variability. Environmental good production remunerated by means of agri-
environmental agreements is considered as a riskless activity. This is justified by the
fact that agri-environmental agreements propose a guaranteed annual payment to the
farmer during several years (5, 10 or 20) in exchange for his compliance with
requirements involved in the contract. These requirements include some restrictions on
the farming activity and/or they demand additional tasks to be carried out. The farmer
is remunerated for compliance with the requirements and not for the result of his
compliance. Thus not only the amount of the payment is guaranteed but also the
farmer controls entirely the respect of conditions implying the attribution of the
payment. The assumption of the riskless character of agri-environmental agreements
enables a straightforward comparative statics analysis of the impact of economic and
policy parameters, like the output price variability or the amount of decoupledP. Havlík et al. - Review of Agricultural and Environmental Studies, 86 (2008 - 1), 9-33
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subsidies, on environmental good production by risk-averse farmers. These results can
be more or less directly derived from those known in the finance literature. Our major
aim is to draw attention to the potential usefulness of this analytical framework in the
domain of agricultural and agri-environmental policy analysis.
The analytical framework is illustrated by implementing a mathematical
programming farm level model of a representative suckler cow farm in the Monts du
Cantal , France. In this region, zones representing both complementary and competing
beef and biodiversity production can be found in formally designated ‘Environmentally
Sensitive Areas’ (ESAs), where agri-environmental agreements were proposed to
farmers with the aim to enhance the biodiversity production. A simplified version of
these agreements from two selected ESAs is incorporated into the programming model
in order to represent both competing and complementary biodiversity production.
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section, the analytical model is
introduced both in a formal and a graphical way, and the comparative statics results are
presented. In section 3, the programming model is briefly described, then its basic
results are discussed, and finally, graphical illustration based on the model simulations
is provided for some of the comparative statics results from section 2. Section 4
concludes the paper by a summary of obtained results and by a short discussion of their
policy implications and of their limits.
2. Analytical framework: Portfolio optimisation
To introduce this section, we briefly present the general problem without agri-
environmental agreements, when only risky agricultural commodities can be produced.
In this case, the farmer’s stochastic profit can be expressed as follows:
, with (1a)
A c is the area cultivated before agreements are proposed, and A is the total
available area. The total available area is throughout the paper considered fixed. A c is a
decision variable in this model without agri-environmental agreements, but it is not
allowed to exceed A . For notational convenience, A c and A are in what follows
normalised so that A c = 1 1 . x i is the level of activity i per hectare. We will often refer
to the vector of per hectare levels of activities x i ( i = 1,…,n), as to the structure of the
portfolio of risky activities, or of agricultural commodities. Activities i represent both
different animal categories (lean heifers, fattened bulls,…), and different techniques of
production of the same animal category (grain-fed heifers, grass-fed heifers,…). This
differentiation enables adjustments in the portfolio of risky activities both in terms of
diversification, by changing the herd structure, and in terms of intensification or
extensification, by changing the per hectare production within a constant herd
structure. is the stochastic gross margin per unit of activity i – its stochastic
1 In the models with agri-environmental agreements, A c cannot be changed because it represents
the area cultivated before implementation of the agreements; it is a fixed parameter. Therefore it
is convenient to set it equal to 1.
Eπ
E E π =+ – Axr LF C cii ∑ 0 ≤≤ AA c
Er i13
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character stems from the output price variability, L is a decoupled subsidy awarded to
the farmer as a lump sum payment without any linkage with the agricultural activity,
and FC is the fixed cost.
The expected value of the profit µ is
, with , (2a)
where is the expected gross margin of activity i , and represents the expected
gross margin of the portfolio of risky activities.
The standard deviation of the profit σ is
, with ,(3a)
where is the variance of the gross margin of activity i and is the covariance
between gross margins of activities i and j . Since only risky activities are present in the
portfolio, the standard deviation of the global profit is equal to the standard deviation
of the gross margin from risky activities .
The set of portfolios of risky activities which provide the minimum standard
deviation for particular levels of expected profit, constitutes the efficient frontier. (For
a formal specification, see the programme defined by equations (P.1-8) in section 3
designed to generate efficient frontiers and other relevant information). We make a
common assumption that the efficient frontier is concave, which means that initially,
the expected profit can be increased without much increase in its variability, but
beyond a certain range, additional profit cannot be obtained without considerably
increasing the variability. This form is determined by the fact that some production
factors are fixed. Thus, in order to obtain additional expected profit, either more
profitable and more risky activities are to be introduced into the portfolio, like animal
categories with higher volatility of sale prices, or more intensive activities, which
enable to increase the per hectare production. Intensification beyond the initially
optimal level leads to a more than proportionate increase in production costs therefore
the resulting increase in profit variability is not compensated by an adequate increase
in its expected value.
The risk-averse farmer is supposed to constitute his portfolio of activities so that
it maximises his utility expressed as a function of the first two moments of the profit
distribution – mean and standard deviation. Utility function U ( µ , σ ) is assumed
increasing in the expected profit, , decreasing in its standard deviation, ,
and concave 2 . Meyer (1987) formally derived some important characteristics of
indifference curves associated with the utility function U ( µ , σ ): The slope of
2 Meyer (1987) demonstrated that under the ‘location and scale parameter condition’, maximisation
of U ( µ , σ ) leads to results consistent with those obtained by maximisation of the expected utility of
profit , with and . In the case studied here, this condition is fulfilled;
the profit depends linearly on the stochastic gross margins , hence the profit distributions
differ from one another only by location and scale parameters.
µµ =+ – R LF C µ Rii xr = ∑
r i µ R
σσ = R σσ Rijij
J i
xx = ∑ ∑
σ ii σ ij
σ R
U µ ≥ 0 U σ ≤ 0
EW() Eπ W ’( ) Eπ >0 W ’’( ) Eπ <0
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indifference curves S ( µ , σ ) is non-negative, , the indifference
curves are convex, and for farmers who exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion
(DARA), the slope of indifference curves decreases as the expected profit
increases, 3 . These characteristics will be in what follows
extensively used both for the formal and graphical comparative statics analysis.
The solution to the farmer’s maximisation problem corresponds to the tangency
point between the efficient frontier (EF) and an indifference curve (IC). In figure 1, if
no agri-environmental agreement were proposed, the optimum production portfolio of
agricultural commodities would correspond to the point R.
2.1. Competing beef and biodiversity production
Agri-environmental agreements concerning biodiversity production demand from the
farmer a decrease of the farming intensity if biodiversity production is competing for
resources with beef production. An illustrative example are the environmental set-
asides where the farmer receives a payment for not using a part of his land for
agricultural production. Thus he exchanges a part of the risky income from agricultural
commodities production for a guaranteed income from environmental good
production. The profit function can be in this case written as follows:
, , ,(1b)
where z represents the share of land withdrawn from agricultural production to be
enrolled in the agri-environmental agreement, and t represents the transfer payment
per hectare of land enrolled. Here we assume that the farmer was cultivating all the
available land A before the agreement has been proposed, and that he can enroll all his
previously cultivated land in the agreement. In reality, only a part of the farm is often
eligible for agri-environmental agreements; this constraint is explicitly accounted for in
the applied analysis in section 3.
The expected value of the profit involving production of competing
environmental goods is
,(2b)
and its standard deviation is
(3b)
The possibility to enroll some land in the riskless agreement aiming at competing
biodiversity production is presented graphically in figure 1. The farmer can gain the
3 For expositional reasons, we consider all through the paper that farmers exhibit decreasing
absolute risk aversion. DARA preference assumption is well supported by empirical studies carried
out by e.g. Lins et al . (1981), Saha et al . (1994) or Chavas and Holt (1996). However, the present
analysis is readily transposable to the cases of increasing (IARA) or constant (CARA) absolute risk
aversion as well.
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sum T, , without facing any risk if he enrolls all his land in the
agreement ( z = 1). T represents for him a certainty equivalent. Tobin’s separation
theorem implies that as long as z is strictly positive, the farmer first determines the
structure of the portfolio of risky activitiesx i, and only then, depending on his
preference structure, he decides about its extent by determining the share of land (1 –z )
on which this portfolio should be produced. The optimum portfolio of risky activities
is determined as a tangency point between the efficient frontier without environmental
good production and a straight line emanating from the point T, the point A. The
overall efficient frontier, containing both risky and riskless activities, is now composed
of two segments: a linear segment, in finance literature called sometimes a market
opportunity line, which represents linear combinations of the certainty equivalent and
the optimum portfolio of risky activities corresponding to the point A, and a concave
segment, the part of the original – before the agri-environmental agreement – efficient
frontier situated rightwards to the tangency point A, where only risky activities enter
the efficient portfolios.
The equation of the market opportunity line follows from equations (2b) and (3b)
(4b)
It can be deduced directly from equation (4b) that an increase in the agri-
environmental payment t will, by decreasing the slope of the opportunity line, shift the
structure of the portfolio of agricultural commodities towards higher expected profits
with higher variability. In figure 1, this is depicted by the shift from the portfolio of
risky activities corresponding to the point A, to the portfolio corresponding to the
point C, as the result of an increase in the agri-environmental payment from t to t ’,
which shifts the point T to the point T’. Higher expected profits from risky activities
can be obtained either by incorporating new activities with higher profitability and
higher variability, or by increasing the per hectare production of activities present in
the portfolio A. Thus risk aversion can partially explain, at least for zones where
diversification possibilities are limited, the perverse effects of some environmental
agreements which aiming at extensification of agricultural production on a part of the
farm, induce its intensification on the land non-enrolled in the agreement.
The structure of the optimum portfolio of risky agricultural commodities, if
production of the riskless environmental good is strictly positive, can be determined
without caring about the farmers’ preference structure. However, in order to determine
the share of land a farmer will enroll in the agreement, we have to consider his utility
function. We follow the procedure proposed by Ormiston and Schlee (2001), who
suggest to reformulate the two-moment utility function into a function V of a single
variable. In our case, it is appropriate to define V as a function of the share of land z
enrolled in the agreement
(5b)
The necessary condition for an interior solution to the farmer’s maximization
problem is
V z = ( t – µ R ) U µ – σ R U σ = 0(6b)
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and if the function is concave, which follows directly from the concavity of ,
then equation (6b) is also a sufficient condition. According to Milgrom and Shannon
(1994, Theorem 4), the comparative statics results for the optimal share of land enrolled
in the agreement can in this case be derived by differentiating V z with respect to the
studied parameters. The obtained results are summarised in proposition 1.
Proposition 1.
If is concave, and , and the farmer’s preferences exhibit DARA,
then the share of land z enrolled in an agri-environmental agreement aiming at
biodiversity production competing with beef production
(a)i ncreases if the expected value of the gross margin from beef production, µ R ,
decreases;
(b)i ncreases if the standard deviation of the gross margin from beef production,
σ R , increases;
(c)i ncreases (decreases) if the lump sum payment, L , (the fixed cost, FC)
decreases, and
(d) may increase or decrease if the agri-environmental payment, t , increases.
The proof of proposition 1 is provided in the appendix.
Generally speaking, the comparative statics results depend on two effects: a direct
effect 4 and an indirect, wealth, effect. The direct effect corresponds to a rotation of the
efficient frontier around the initial indifference curve. The wealth effect is due to a
change in the level of expected profit and generates a vertical shift of the new efficient
frontier. The wealth effect arises because the absolute risk aversion of DARA farmers
Figure 1. Tobin’s separation theorem and the competing beef and biodiversity production
4 The direct effect is often called also the substitution effect. This terminology is not appropriate
for our paper because it postulates competition between the riskless and risky activities, and we
deal also with complementary activities.
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decreases as the level of expected profit increases. We will turn back to the particular
comparative statics results when discussing the illustrative application in section 3.3.,
here only the point (d) is shortly exposed.
The derivative of W Z , with respect to t is
(7b)
The sign of the first term, U µ , gives the sign of the direct effect; it is always
positive. The type of the farmer’s absolute risk aversion gives the sign of the second
term, which is the indirect effect. For DARA farmers, the indirect effect is negative.
Hence, the overall effect of an increase in the agri-environmental payment on the area
enrolled in the agreement is ambiguous. The two effects can be interpreted as follows:
An increase in the agri-environmental payment makes biodiversity production
relatively more attractive but at the same time, it increases the farmer’s income, and a
farmer exhibiting decreasing absolute risk aversion will be less motivated to stabilise
his income by production of riskless environmental goods. Only if the direct effect is
stronger than the wealth effect, an increase in the transfer payment will produce an
increase in the area enrolled in the agreement 5 .
The case where the direct effect gains over the wealth effect is depicted in
figure 1. The optimum portfolio containing both biodiversity and agricultural
commodities production corresponds to the tangency point between the market
opportunity line and an indifference curve; for the initial agreement payment t , it
corresponds to the point B. This portfolio is composed of environmental good
production on the share of land z = |AB|/|AT|, and of agricultural commodities
production in the structure determined by the point A, on the share of land (1 – z ). In
this figure, the share of land enrolled in the agreement under the initial payment is
lower than the share of land z’ = |CD|/|CT’| enrolled in the agreement under an
increased payment t ’.
2.2. Complementary beef and biodiversity production
Often the most valuable grasslands from the biodiversity point of view are being
abandoned because their management is not profitable. Their re-utilisation induces
some cost due to the necessary shrub clearing, renewal of the grassland or shrub
prevention, and some benefits in the form of supplementary forage. An agri-
environmental payment covers usually only a part of this cost, the rest is supposed
being covered by the benefits from increased agricultural commodities production. The
stochastic profit function can be in this case specified as follows
, , ,(1c)
5 Similarly, in an analytical framework based on the mean-standard deviation utility function,
Leathers and Quiggin (1991) derived that the effect of a tax on pesticides on their use by DARA
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where all the terms maintain their meaning presented above, except of z which still
indicates the area to be enrolled in the agri-environmental agreement, but because of
the nature of this agreement, it should be interpreted as a coefficient with respect to
the area ( A c) cultivated before the agreement has been proposed rather than its share.
The new parameter s represents the unit cost of shrub clearing, s > t . We assume that
the area cultivated before the agri-environmental agreement has been proposed, was
lower than the total available area, A , and that the farmer can enroll in the agreement
any share of the abandoned land. In this analytical part, we do not impose any limit
on A , thus z is virtually unconstrained from above. A reasonable upper limit will be
explicitly accounted for in the illustrative application presented in the next section 6 .
The expected value of the profit involving production of complementary
environmental goods is
,(2c)
and its standard deviation is
.( 3c)
The complementary beef and biodiversity production is depicted in figure 2. As in
figure 1, the optimum portfolio of risky activities if no agri-environmental agreements
are proposed corresponds to the point R. But the farmer can re-utilise his previously
abandoned grassland even without agreements if the cost of its clearing is covered by
returns from beef production. We can draw a line which is tangent to the concave
efficiency set and which emanates from the point Q R on the y-axis, Q R = s + L – FC.
Q R resembles to the certainty equivalent point T in figure 1 but it is not. Because
while it is possible to re-gain abandoned grassland for the unit cost s , we do not
suppose that the farmer will be paid s if he stops the beef production. The market
opportunity line 7 without agreements must be tangent to the efficient frontier at the
point R, or rightwards to it, because we suppose that the farmer already re-gained the
grassland he needed and the cost of regaining any supplementary grassland would not
be covered by the stochastic returns. In the case of complementarity, the efficient
frontier is composed of two segments – a concave one and a linear one – independently
from the existence of an agri-environmental programme. The efficient frontier is
concave up to the tangency point with the opportunity line, the point P in figure 2.
Up to this point, efficient portfolios are constituted by adjustments in the structure of
6 This problem is not completely symmetric to the one presented in section 2.1. The symmetric
problem would have to be set as follows: ‘The Government aims at competing biodiversity
production therefore it puts a tax on re-utilisation of the previously abandoned grassland.’ Hence,
the payment t in section 2.1. is in the present section symmetric rather to the cost of shrub clearing
s than to the agreement payment t .
7 We maintain the terminology, however inappropriate, in order to save correspondence with the
competing production case. The market opportunity line is drawn starting from the y-axis only to
show its relationship with the point Q R . Since the farmer cannot obtain any compensation for
diverting his land from agricultural production, only the part of the market opportunity line
situated to the right to the tangency point with the efficient frontier of risky activities enters the
efficient frontier.
µµ =– ++ +– zt sz LF C R () () 1
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agricultural commodities production on the non-degraded land. Beyond the point P,
the efficient frontier becomes linear; the farmer expands agricultural production on the
progressively regained grassland without changing the commodities structure. If a
positive agri-environmental payment is proposed to the farmer, the origin of the
market opportunity line shifts downwards from the point Q R to the point Q,
.
The equation of the market opportunity line with an agri-environmental
agreement aiming at complementary biodiversity production follows from equations
(2c) and (3c)
(4c)
Without considering the farmer’s preference structure, equation (4c) implies that
an increase in the agri-environmental payment from t to t’ , will shift the origin of the
market opportunity line further downwards, from the point Q to the point Q’, and
will increase the slope of the market opportunity line. Together with the concavity of
the efficient frontier, this will encourage a change in the composition of the production
bundle of agricultural commodities in direction of lower expected profits, the shift
from the point A to the point C in figure 2. This implies that in situations where an
agri-environmental payment aiming at biodiversity production competing with beef
production is likely to enhance the farming intensity on the non-enrolled parcels, an
agri-environmental payment aiming at biodiversity production complementary to beef
production will lead to reduction of the farming intensity.
The utility function expressed as a function of the share of land z enrolled in the
agri-environmental agreement can be written in the complementary case as
(5c)
Figure 2. Tobin’s separation theorem and the complementary beef and biodiversity production
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The necessary and sufficient condition for an interior solution to the farmer’s
maximization problem is
(6c)
The comparative statics results concerning the optimal share of land z enrolled in
the agreement can be obtained in the case of complementarity by the same procedure
as in the case of competition. These results are summarised in proposition 2.
Proposition 2.
If is concave, and , and the farmer’s preferences exhibit
DARA, then the share of land z enrolled in an agri-environmental agreement aiming
at biodiversity production complementary to beef production
(a)i ncreases if the expected value of the gross margin from beef production, µ R ,
increases;
(b)i ncreases if the standard deviation of the gross margin from beef production,
σ R , decreases;
(c)i ncreases (decreases) if the lump-sum payment, L , (the fixed cost, FC)
increases, and
(d) increases (decreases) if the agri-environmental payment, t , (the unit cost of
shrub clearing, s ) increases.
The proof of proposition 2 is provided in the appendix.
The comparative statics results are symmetric to those obtained for the competing
biodiversity production, except of the point (d). Unlike in the case of competition, we
are able to sign unambiguously the effect of a change in the agri-environmental
payment on the area enrolled in the agreement in the case of complementarity. The
derivative of V z with respect to t is as follows
(7c)
The first term, representing the direct effect, is positive as in equation (7b), but
here, also the indirect effect is positive. An increase in the agri-environmental payment
makes biodiversity production not only relatively more attractive but it also increases
the farmer’s income and thus makes for him the risky income from supplementary beef
production on the cleared grassland more acceptable as partial compensation for the
shrub clearing. This is represented graphically in figure 2. An increase in the agri-
environmental payment makes the opportunity line steeper therefore the tangency
point with a convex indifference curve must shift towards a higher expected profit with
higher variability. But this increase enables also to attain higher indifference curves.
Since the slope of indifference curves decreases for a DARA farmer as the level of
utility increases, the indirect effect induces further shift of the tangency point towards
more variable portfolios. Hence, the share of land enrolled in the agri-environmental
agreement when payment t ’ is proposed, z ’ = |CD|/|CQ’|, will always be higher than the
share of land enrolled in the agreement for the initial paymentt , z = |AB|/|AQ|.
Vts UU zRR =+ += − () µσ µσ 0
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3. An illustrative application
How the above presented analytical framework applies in practice is demonstrated on
a case study of beef and biodiversity production by suckler cow farms in Monts du
Cantal in Massif Central , France. The Monts du Cantal is a humid volcanic region with
an altitude reaching from 900 to 1 300 meters where the cattle rearing plays a crucial
role in the preservation of an open countryside and of the species richness of
omnipresent meadows. Several zones were designated as Environmentally Sensitive
Areas (ESAs), (in French: opérations locales agri-environnementales, OLAE) in order to
enhance both the complementary and competing beef and grassland biodiversity
production.
A representative of the competing beef and biodiversity production is the
Tourbières du Nord Cantal (Northern Cantal Peatlands) ESA. It is constituted around
valuable peatlands where the danger of over intensification is predominant because of
the fragility of these biotopes. Several agri-environmental agreements were proposed to
farmers containing basically restrictions on fertilisation and on the animal density. The
eligibility of parcels for a particular agreement depends on their distance from the
peatland; the constraints become more severe when approaching the peatland.
The Haute Vallée du Mars (Upper Valley of the Mars River) ESA concerns a valley,
where on the contrary, grassland biodiversity is jeopardised by abandonment or by very
low intensity of agricultural activity. The beef and biodiversity production are
complementary there. The agri-environmental agreements impose in this case
minimum stocking density requirements and demand renovation of already degraded
grasslands. A good representative is the agreement aiming at regaining heavily
degraded pastures (pastures covered by more than 35 per cent by bushes), which asks
the farmers for mechanical clearing in the first year and for maintenance by pasture in
the following years. Agreements are signed for 5 years.
3.1. Model description
Efficient frontiers and other relevant results are obtained by solving the following
programme of minimisation of the standard deviation of profit σ , equation (P.1), for
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Tourbières ESA (P.5b Land)
or




where w k is the probability of the state k , π k is the net income in the state of nature k ,
X i is the total (not ‘per hectare’ as in the analytical model) level of different activities,
r ik is the gross margin of activity i if the state of nature k occurs, Z is the area enrolled
in the agri-environmental agreement (in hectares), and t , s , L , and FC remain as
defined above ( s = 0 for the Tourbières ESA). c im is the input requirement coefficient of
activity i for input m (all inputs except land), and d m is the available quantity of input
m , c iLand is the land requirement coefficient of activity i , and d Land is the available non-
degraded land. ZE is the area eligible for the agri-environmental agreement. The
optimisation is carried out overdecision variables X i and Z . ( Z would correspond to
zA c from section 2 if A c were expressed in hectares and not normalised to 1).
For these simulations, we applied a simplified version of the Opt’INRA Salers.
Opt’INRA Salers 8 is a linear programming model constructed on the basis of the
Opt’INRA model 9 and adapted for analysis of suckler cow farms breeding the Salers
cow in the studied region. INRA has an experimental farm in Marcenat , on the
Cézallier plateau in the Cantal region of France, which is home to a herd of suckler cows
of the hardy Salers breed. It is an experimental site for the EU project FORBIOBEN 10
and has reliable technical references on forage and animals at one’s service.
Complementary data sources used for the parameterisation of the Opt’INRA Salers
were: historical cases from regional farm networks (Réseaux d’élevage Auvergne et
Lozère, 2003), the opinions of experts from the Chamber of Agriculture of the Cantal
and technical references obtained by INRA’s proper research on the types of Salers
animals and the mountain forage areas. The basic model structure is as follows:
– Animal production determines breeding activities (different stages of the life of
an animal in relation to its diet and the production goal) and sales. The central
element is the Salers suckler cow. It calves on 15 February, can be fertilised by
a bull of the Salers or Charolais breed and may or may not be ‘premium-
eligible’. The herd is restocked with heifers from stock in the case of pure-breed
farms and with the purchase of heifers of different ages for mixed-breed farms.
All of the sales categories of males and females (young, old, lean, fat, premium,
non-premium) encountered at this time in the studied area, in total 32 animal
8 For more details about this model see Havlík et al ., 2005.
9 See a detailed description of this model in Veysset et al ., 2005.
10 FORBIOBEN: Foraging for Biodiversity and Benefits, QLK-2001-00130
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categories, were introduced into the model and represent now the risky
activities which may enter the production portfolio.
– Animal feed is based on conserved forage (hay, bales or regrowth) in the winter
and on pasture alone in the summer because the entire utilisable agricultural
area (UAA) is constituted by grassland. All of the forage is produced on the
farm and can be supplemented by purchased concentrate when necessary.
Rations for each animal were calculated according to its weight, its needs
(production, growth) and the quality of the forage dispensed, maximising the
quantity of forage ingested. Each animal can choose between different types of
rations but with the same nutritional value. Opt’INRA Salers arbitrates
between the number, the type of animal and the types of rations provided in
order to balance needs and resources.
– The grassland management system is relatively complex. Different types of
grasslands were defined according to the farmers’ practices (early mowing +
grazing, late mowing + grazing, topping + mowing + grazing, etc.). A
grassland management schedule was established and the growth and grass
farming season was thus divided into six periods. For the purpose of this study,
we considered that all of the hay meadows received organic fertilisation
corresponding to the herd maintained during winter. Each type of grassland
produces a specific quantity and quality of forage for each period.
Two simplifications were applied to the original model in order to make the
results more transparent. First, in the original version, the model accounts for the
heterogeneity in parcels; distinction is made for example between areas that can be
used as hay meadows and those that cannot, or between fertilisable and non-fertilisable
areas. This heterogeneity was removed from the model which is applied here. All the
parcels are homogeneous and the model is entirely free to decide about the number of
hectares managed in a particular way. The second simplification concerns the
administrative framework. In the original model the pertinent CAP premiums are
depicted and the model can choose whether or not to claim each premium, with the
constraints that this implies. These constraints were likely to deteriorate the
comparability with the theoretical framework exposed above, which does not account
for them. We aggregated all the premiums in a single payment attributed per livestock
unit. (The amount of this payment was calculated from results obtained with the
original model for the CAP 2002 payment scheme).
Uncertainty stems from the volatility of output prices. Five sets of prices were
used corresponding to annual average output prices of the years 1998-2002. Not
having at hand any more suitable estimation of subjective probabilities the farmers
accord to these prices, we assume that any of these sets of prices can occur with the
same probability, 20 per cent. In order to analyse the impact of different degrees of
price variability on biodiversity production, the output prices were in the model
defined in the following form
, (P.9)
where p ik is the price of the output i in the state of nature k , is the expected
valueo f the price of output i , and ε ik is the deviation from the expected price in
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the state k . The parameter h serves to model a change in the price variability
without affecting the price level.
The agreement representing the Tourbières ESA, where the aim is to reduce the
intensity of farming in the neighbourhood of the peatlands, is modelled by the
possibility not to utilise up to 25 hectares of the total UAA, which is 100 hectares, in
exchange for a per hectare agreement payment (450 euros per ha per year). The
agreement applying to the Mars ESA is represented by the possibility to acquire up to
25 hectares of additional grassland to the initial 100 hectares. There is a unit cost
attributed to the shrub clearing of the parcel (750 euros per ha per year during 5 years)
and a payment for each hectare cleared (300 euros per ha per year). The number of
hectares eligible for both agreements is limited to cover only a part of the farm, and
land eligible just for one of the two agreements can be found on one farm as they
concern distinct ESAs.
3.2. Basic simulation results
In this section the results of simulations obtained by applying the programme (P.1-8)
are presented graphically – in the terms of efficient frontiers (EF), biodiversity
production, approximated by the number of hectares enrolled in one or another
agreement (Z), and farming intensity (I), approximated by the number of livestock
units per hectare.
Figure 3 contains results for competing beef and biodiversity production. The
efficient frontier consists of four segments, two linear ones and two concave ones. The
segment n° 1 is linear and it emanates from the value of expected profit where the
standard deviation is equal to zero. This point generally corresponds to the negative
value of fixed cost and to zero agricultural activity. But in the modelled case, the
farmer has the possibility to enroll a part of his land in an agreement which
remunerates him for not utilising it. So the highest expected profit attainable is equal
to the negative value of fixed cost plus the number of hectares eligible for the
agreement (25 hectares) multiplied by the agreement payment. (This point is not
depicted in the picture).
The first segment is linear because the farmer determines once the optimal
structure of his activities and than he only increases the share of land in production
before the limit of a fixed factor, here only land is considered as such, is hit. This is
confirmed by the shape of the dashed curve which represents the farming intensity and
whose value is in the first segment constant. (The value can be read on the secondary
y-axis). The number of hectares enrolled in the agreement is measured by the crank-
shaped biodiversity production curve. Its value can be read on the principal y-axis
similarly as the expected profit which is expressed in 1 000 euros. In the first segment,
all the eligible grassland is enrolled in the agreement.
When the grassland becomes a limiting factor for further increase of the expected
profit, adjustments in the production structure occur in order to use the land more
efficiently and to save the agri-environmental payment. This leads to an increase in the
farming intensity on land in production, and to a more than proportionate increase in
the profit variability compared to its expected value. Thus the efficient frontier is25
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concave in segment n° 2. Also in this segment, all the eligible land remains enrolled in
the agreement.
The linear segment n° 3 corresponds to a progressive reduction of the grassland
enrolled in the agreement with a constant structure of beef production activities and a
constant farming intensity on the non-enrolled grassland. It represents a fragment of the
market opportunity line from figure 1. Since only a part of the grassland is considered
as eligible for the agreement, not the whole opportunity line can be integrated in the
efficient frontier but only its fragment. The fact that Tobin’s separation theorem applies
exclusively to this part of the efficient frontier, does not harm the comparative statics
analysis because the biodiversity production changes just along this segment.
The last concave segment, n° 4, corresponds to the situation where no grassland is
enrolled in the agreement. At this stage, additional expected profit can be obtained only
by adjusting the farming system, which also actually happens as can be seen regarding
the evolution of the farming intensity. This segment is identical to the corresponding
part of an efficient frontier when no agri-environmental agreement is proposed.
The case of complementary beef and biodiversity production is depicted in
figure 4. The efficient frontier is once again composed of two linear and two concave
segments but their meaning is different from the case above. The linear segment n° 1
emanates from the point where the standard deviation is equal to zero and the expected
profit is equal to the negative value of fixed costs. (This point is not depicted in the
picture). The reason of the linearity is the same as in the competing beef and
biodiversity case. The linear development lasts as long as there is some free non-
degraded grassland. In this segment no land is enrolled in the agreement aiming at
regaining the degraded grassland.
Adjustments in the farming system, which are behind the concavity of the
segment n° 2, are motivated by the aim to use the non-degraded grassland as
efficiently as possible before proceeding to clearing some additional land. Farming
intensity increases in this segment and still no degraded grassland is being regained.
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The segment n° 3 is linear and it corresponds to a fragment of the market
opportunity line from figure 2. Only to a fragment because the amount of degraded
grassland is limited. In accord with the Tobin’s separation theorem, the structure of
beef production and farming intensity are constant and the adjustment concerns just the
extent of the beef and biodiversity production. The area enrolled in the agreement
linearly increases. In the last segment, n° 4, all the eligible land is already enrolled. This
segment is concave because there is no further possibility to acquire additional grassland
and the expected profit can be increased only by changing the farming system.
In section 2, before having introduced into the model the indifference curves, we
derived that an increase of the payment for biodiversity competing with agricultural
commodities will encourage the farmer to engage in a more profitable but also more
risky structure of beef production. We argued that in production systems with limited
diversification possibilities, like beef cattle farms in less favoured areas, this is likely to
Figure 4. Portfolio optimisation with an agri-environmental agreement
for complementary beef and biodiversity production
Figure 5. Effects of different levels of agri-environmental payments on farming intensity in the
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result in an increase in the farming intensity on land not enrolled in the agreement.
Figure 5 provides a comparison of farming intensities under the base value of agri-
environmental payments, represented by the dashed lines, and farming intensities
under agri-environmental payments increased by 300 euros per hectare, represented by
the solid lines. Figure 5a represents the case of the Tourbières ESA with competing
beef and biodiversity production. It shows that with the increased agri-environmental
agreement, the farming intensity is above the farming intensity corresponding to the
base payment, all over the range where the area enrolled in the agreement is different
– higher – from the area enrolled with the base payment. These results confirm that
agri-environmental agreements aiming at extensification on a part of the farm may
encourage intensification on the rest of the land if uncertainty is present and the
farmers are risk-averse. Figure 5b shows that this effect is opposite in the Mars ESA,
where beef and biodiversity production is complementary; the farming intensity with
an increased agreement payment is, over the range where the enrolled areas differ,
always lower than the farming intensity with the base payment.
3.3. Uncertainty and decoupled direct payments
Some comparative statics results concerning the effects of different economic and policy
parameters on environmental good production were analytically derived in section 2. In
what follows, these results are illustrated graphically for the parameters of special
interest with respect to the recent CAP reform: The output price variability and the
amount of decoupled subsidies. The presented figures contain efficient frontiers and
corresponding biodiversity production curves generated by the above presented models.
The simulation results are complemented by theoretical indifference curve maps
representing a farmer with decreasing absolute risk aversion.
3.3.1. Uncertainty
For the analysis of a change in the level of uncertainty, we consider an increase in the
beef price variability. It is modelled by an increase of the value of the parameter h
presented in equation (P.9), from 4 to 5 11. The results are presented in figures 6a and
6b for competing biodiversity production in the Tourbières ESA and for
complementary biodiversity production in the Mars ESA, respectively. The solid lines
correspond to the initial level of output price variability, the dashed lines correspond
to its increased level. An increase in the variability of beef prices rotates the efficient
frontiers clockwise downwards and reduces thus the slope of efficient frontiers. The
resulting direct effect encourages farmers to shift towards portfolios with lower
expected profits. The wealth effect reinforces the direct effect because the indifference
curves of DARA farmers become steeper at lower levels of utility. In the case of
competition, the optimum portfolio shifts from the point A to the point B, and
consequently, the biodiversity production increases from level A’ to level B’. In the case
of complementarity, the initial portfolio corresponding to the point C shifts to the
11 Simulations were carried out for higher than observed levels of the output price variability in
order to enhance readability of the schemes.P. Havlík et al. - Review of Agricultural and Environmental Studies, 86 (2008 - 1), 9-33
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point D, and in this case, biodiversity production decreases from the initial level
corresponding to the point C’ to a lower level corresponding to the point D’.
The direct and wealth effects can be interpreted as follows: In the case of
competition, the more variable income from agricultural production is for a risk-averse
farmer less attractive therefore he is more inclined to exchange a part of it for the lower
but riskless income from the agri-environmental agreement. This lower income makes
a DARA farmer even more risk-averse and encourages him further to exchange the
variable income for the sure one by increasing the area diverted from beef production
to biodiversity production. If complementary biodiversity is at stake, the reasoning is
similar. The utility resulting from the highly variable income is no longer sufficient to
cover the part of the shrub clearing cost which is not covered by the agreement
payment. (We recall that it is supposed that the cost of regaining the abandoned
grassland is never completely covered by the agreement payment and it should be
partially compensated by supplementary gains from beef production). The utility of the
supplementary income from additional beef production is not only lower because the
income variability increased but also because the DARA farmer is at the new utility
level more risk-averse.
3.3.2. Decoupled subsidies
Effects of the introduction of a decoupled subsidy in the form of a lump sum payment
are presented in figure 7, where a lump sum payment of 5000 euros is accorded to the
farmers; solid and dashed lines represent the situations without and with the decoupled
subsidy, respectively. The decoupled subsidy does not influence either the variability of
the income from agricultural production nor its relative profitability compared to
biodiversity production therefore the efficient frontier just shifts upwards and remains
perfectly parallel to the original one. Introduction of a decoupled subsidy has no direct
effect on the choice of optimum production portfolio. Its only effect, in our simplified
Figure 6. Effects of different levels of output price variability on a) competing
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model, is the wealth effect. DARA indifference curves become flatter, the farmers
become less risk averse, as the level of the expected profit increases, so the tangency
point with the new efficient frontier moves northeast, corresponding to the shifts from
the point A to the point B in figure 7a, and from the point C to the point D in
figure 7b. These shifts in optimum portfolios bring about a decrease in competing
biodiversity production and an increase in complementary biodiversity production.
The economic rational behind the adjustments of biodiversity production after
introduction of a decoupled subsidy can be interpreted as follows: The wealth effect
makes the variable income more attractive both for farmers producing competing
biodiversity in the Tourbières ESA, and for farmers producing complementary
biodiversity in the Mars ESA. The farmers in the Tourbières ESA are thus less
motivated to stabilise their incomes by entering in the agri-environmental agreement,
and competing biodiversity declines. On the other hand, complementary biodiversity
in the Mars ESA increases because the variability of the income from supplementary
beef production becomes less a problem for the Mars ESA farmers so that they are
ready to clear the previously abandoned grassland.
4. Conclusion
An analytical framework was proposed which enables to analyse the willingness of a
DARA risk-averse farmer to enroll in an agri-environmental agreement when facing
uncertainty in output prices. In this framework, the agri-environmental payments are
considered as a riskless income. Both competing as well as complementary beef and
biodiversity production was analysed applying mathematical programming farm level
models of a representative suckler cow farm in the Monts du Cantal . However, the
modelled agri-environmental agreements represent just the extreme cases where in the
competing case, some grassland should be completely diverted from beef production,
and in the complementary one, some abandoned grassland is to be re-utilised. In
Figure 7. Effects of different levels of decoupled subsidies on a) competing and b)
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reality, many agreements only limit, do not exclude, farming activity, or demand
clearing of only partially degraded pastures. Since we dealt with the extreme cases in
order to make more visible the principles of the proposed framework, the obtained
results remain qualitative.
As mentioned in the introduction, this paper is closely related to the one by
Havlík et al . (2005). Both papers analyse the effects of parameters like the amount of
decoupled subsidies or the output price variability on competing and complementary
grassland biodiversity production, and they are applied to the same case studies. The
papers differ mainly by the analytical framework; Havlík et al . (2005) carried out their
analysis within an expected utility model, while this paper adopted the mean-standard
deviation model and applied the Tobin’s separation theorem. The comparative statics
results obtained by the two models are equivalent: An increase in the output price
variability and/or a decrease in the level of decoupled subsidies will have positive effects
on competing biodiversity production and negative effects on complementary
biodiversity production. These results are in line with those derived by Hennessy
(1998) who was reasoning in terms of input use. Although not surprising, these results
can be considered as a sort of validation of the analytical model presented in this paper.
More interesting, and without equivalents in Havlík et al . (2005), are the
comparative statics with respect to agri-environmental payments. We demonstrated
that parcels not enrolled in an agreement aiming at low-intensity grassland
management are likely to be managed more intensively after an increase of the
agreement payment. As such agri-environmental agreements often request ‘low’
farming intensity and not ‘lowering’ of the farming intensity, the farmer usually
enrolls parcels where the intensity is already sufficiently low for whatever reason, e.g.
poor land quality, and not the others. While the environmental effect of such an
agreement is zero if the farmer is risk-neutral, the environmental effect is negative if
the farmer is risk-averse. This result favours whole farm agri-environmental programs
which require that also the grassland not enrolled in specific agreements should be
managed in an environment friendly way. Whole farm agri-environmental
programmes are currently applied for example in Austria or in the Czech Republic. If
a farmer wants to enter the Czech Sound Grassland Management programme, he has to
enroll all his grassland in a general management agreement. If his grassland is eligible,
he can enroll a part of it also in supplementary, more restrictive, agreements but he
still has to hold all the rest enrolled in the general agreement. Havlík et al . (2006)
analysed whole farm programmes within a principal-agent model with special
attention to adverse selection issues. Their results suggest that whole farm programmes
can help to reduce overcompensation of farmers which typically results from
asymmetric information between farmers and the Government, and thus to make the
agri-environmental policy more cost-effective.
Alternatively, the whole farm framework for more focused agri-environmental
agreements could be provided by decoupled payments linked to properly designed
cross-compliance conditions. On the basis of our results concerning the impact of
decoupled payments on biodiversity production, we would recommend to introduce
environmental regionalisation of decoupled payments. Higher than average direct
payments should be awarded to farmers in regions where biodiversity and agricultural31
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commodities are complementary, and lower than average payments to farmers in
regions where biodiversity competes with agricultural commodities. To a certain
degree, this differentiation already applies within the less favoured area payments,
which can be considered as decoupled payments accorded to farmers in regions where
environmental good production is supposed being complementary to agricultural
commodities production. However, this suggestion is to be taken with precaution. Our
analysis was carried out only for beef cattle grassland based farms; the adaptation
strategies to a change in the amount of decoupled subsidies in other sectors and regions
could lead to disappointing results. For example, Leathers and Quiggin (1991), or
recently, Serra et al . (2006) showed that the effect of a change in the decoupled
payment on use of risk decreasing inputs by DARA farmers is indeterminate. Hence,
theoretically, lower decoupled payments for highly productive regions could induce
increased pesticide application there. More empirical studies are necessary to determine
not only the sign but also the magnitude of these sometimes contradictory effects, so
that informed policy decision can be taken.
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APPENDIX
The comparative statics results rely on the following assumptions about the utility
function: increasing in the expected profit, , decreasing in its standard deviation,
, and concave; with indifference curves whose slope corresponds to the DARA
preference structure:
and .
Proof of Proposition 1
We first notice that equation (6b) is equivalent to
(A.1b)
The calculus will be detailed only for comparative statics on z with respect to µ R , the
point (a). The other results exposed in Proposition 1 are obtained in the same way.
(A.2b)
Recalling the content of equation (A.1b), equation (A.2b) is equivalent to
(A.3b)
According to the assumptions about the utility function, equation (A.3b) is strictly
negative. This proofs the point (a).
Proof of Proposition 2
We first notice that equation (6c) is equivalent to
(A.1c)
The calculus will be detailed only for comparative statics on z with respect to µ R , the
point (a). The other results exposed in Proposition 2 are obtained in the same way.
(A.2c)
Recalling the content of equation (A.1c), equation (A.2c) is equivalent to
(A.3c)
According to the assumptions about the utility function, equation (A.3c) is strictly
positive. This proofs the point (a).
U µ ≥ 0
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